A typology of mysticism like the one we have just seen is a useful tool for organizing our thoughts regarding these complex matters. Even more important, however, is to understand the implications of the problem of the One and the Many, its possible solutions, how each worldview tries to solve the problem, and if it succeeds or not in doing so.

As we have seen, the doctrines of the Many are not really traditional and in time tend to morph into doctrines of the One (e.g., Greek Henotheism, Anarchism escaping from its atomistic isolation and meaninglessness by finding the whole as present in every part).

The famous worldviews representative of Dualism, in turn, were always either monist to begin with (e.g., Gnosticism and Zoroastrianism) or later transformed into it (e.g., Yoga philosophy now being mostly based on Advaita Vedanta instead of Samkhya; Platonism morphing into Neo-Platonism).

This narrows down our possibilities. If we want to find a living worldview that we can take seriously (e.g., unlike modern Neo-Pagan movements that have no formal commitment to a fixed doctrine, fluctuating aimlessly between Atheism, Polytheism, Duo-Theism and even Monism) our options are reduced to pure Monism (absolute Monotheism, Pantheism and Panentheism), Buddhist Non-Dualism or the Tri-Une God of Christianity.

If we believe reality to be Many, in contrast, anarchy as individual self-rule (e.g., Anarcho-Capitalism) will be the priority.

We have an example of the former view in the Enlightenment, where Deism and Illuminism exalted and gave primacy to the notion of the One at the cost of the Many. The poems of this revolutionary time reflected this conviction.^A

In fact, the attempt to bring absolute unification and homogenization to the whole world under an ideal has been a pretty common historical occurrence (usually under the idea of the state understood in a certain way).

This has been defined as trying to create a secular Heaven on earth, by erroneously trying to “bring down” the metaphysical notion of the One into this world (technically speaking: immanentizing the Eschaton [the coming age beyond time]).

The amounts of resulting bloodshed hardly needs to be pointed out. Twentieth century totalitarian regimes (e.g., Communism) are stark and recent reminders of how the obsession with one horn of this dialectic to the absolute exclusion of its opposite can bring suffering and death.

This conflict between the One and the Many has humanity trapped between its dialectical horns in an apparently unsolvable dilemma, with history being the story of their never ending struggle.

By becoming aware of this underlying metaphysical problem we can see that the real problem is not choosing the “good side” or horn of the dialectic, as it is usually believed, but the notion itself that we have to decide between one extreme or the other, with the resulting rejection of its opposite. The Many is not the problem. The One is not either. Dialectics and the exclusive Either/Or logic that underlies it is.

Pure Unity with no Particularity is a blank canvas, while pure Particularity with no underlying Unity is pure chaos. They both share the attribute of meaninglessness and the impossibility of relating to one another.

This is why it is so important to solve this dialectical conflict that shapes our unconscious minds and, consequently, our lives.

This is also why worldviews that transcend this dialectic value the resolution of this conflict so highly, being proof of the truth of their underlying metaphysics.

Solving this problem means transcending our plane of existence, characterized by all kinds of dialectical oppositions: Masculine/Feminine, Free Will/Determinism, Unity/Plurality. Going above and beyond dialectics is the mark of a level of existence that transcends ours.

Therefore, while navigating this complex landscape full of conflicting metaphysical worldviews, there can be no higher rational proof of the validity and the transcendental origin of a particular one than its satisfactory resolution of the problem of the One and the Many in non-dialectical terms.

The worldviews of the One “solve” the problem of the One and the Many by choosing a side. In the following sections we will analyze the pre-suppositions and premises of two of their most influential (and highly represented in modern popular culture) worldviews: Neo-Platonism and Gnosticism, both representatives of Panentheism (or even Pantheism, in some interpretations).

The implication of this process is that the One is only “One” due to its dialectical relationship of opposition to the Many. Therefore, the One needs the Many in a monistic version of Non-Dualism that does not necessarily imply their simultaneity in time, since they can manifest sequentially.

Since all acts of the One are acts of Its Essence, the Many which It creates are not different from It in Essence. This makes the One another name for “the All”, the Absolute, and can end in a fully pantheistic outlook, such as was the case in Porphyry´s version of Neo-Platonism (in which, as R.P. Farrell notes: “St. Augustine will base his understanding of Neoplatonism”³Farrell, Joseph P. (2016). God, History, and Dialectic, Volume I: God, The Foundation of the First Europe, p.107., with its consequent influence in Roman Catholic theology).

In this worldview, the Many is represented by relative and finite matter, which is the last emanation from the One and borders on Non-Existence. This implies that matter, as opposed to the One (which is also the Good), has to represent the notion of “Evil” adopted by systems such as this.

The absolute unity and simplicity characteristic of the One also means that any categories, attributes, or names of “God” whatsoever that are used to describe It, ultimately have the same meaning. They are ontologically reduced to being identical with any other category or attribute predicated of It. The terms Essence, Energy or Will become, then, mere naming conventions signifying the same underlying reality.

There is no difference between what the One is, what It does or how It does it.⁴These distinctions, however, are crucial for the Christian Tri-Une God and its solution to the problem of the One and the Many, as we will later see. Therefore, for the One, being One is the same as being Good. This implies, again, that anything not-One is evil. Because of this rejection of any uniqueness and individuality, the One has been called “the abyss of everything specific.”⁵Tillich, Paul (1956). A History of Christian Thought. Must Have Books, p. 52.

This war on difference resulted in freedom being one of its principal casualties. Freedom implies options to choose from, which means distinction, which for Plotinus means opposition and imperfection. In this dialectical view, this means that every choice becomes a moral one between a good (or better) and evil (or worse) choice. The possibility of multiple alternative but equally good options is not contemplated. This creates the paradox that the One, being perfect and incapable of containing any imperfection, cannot be free, except from Its freedom from choice.

The corollary of this paradox is that the emanations of the One, since they are in dialectical opposition to It, possess free will and the “burden” of choice, while It does not. This violates a key traditional metaphysical principle (and common human reason) in that the inferior plane of existence ends up being superior to its own source in some ways.

This concept of simplicity is also the origin of the doctrine of emanations. If the One is pure Actuality with no Potentiality, any operation of the One has to be eternal. There is no choice in the matter. This implies that “creation”, in the form of emanations, is also eternal. This is another aspect that highlights the inseparability of the One from the Many, even if they are defined as opposites in moral terms.

Also, given that there is no difference between the One´s Essence and Its Energies, ”creation” is essentially “God”. The only difference between Emanator and Emanated is conceived as the relative degree of simplicity between them. It is a quantitative difference, not a qualitative one, contrary to the Creator / Created distinction of theistic religions that also emphasize the freedom of God to will creation out of nothing.

In Plotinus´ system, the First Emanation subordinated to the One is necessarily Mind (Nous or Intellect), since the first distinction and imperfection of absolute Oneness can just be the first appearance of otherness in the form of the One knowing Itself (Subject-Object Dualism). Also, Mind’s most basic operation is that of differentiation or dialectical opposition.

The Second Emanation, subordinate to Mind, is the World Soul. If Nous is the One knowing Itself, the World Soul is the next step in the differentiation process, the knowledge of the Mind knowing Itself.

This completes the Subject-Object-Knowledge sequential triad, with the third term being the union or “glue” between the first and second ones, which are opposed to each other.⁶This structure follows the Filioque structure of the Trinity of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, as we will see in the next articles.

Farrell⁸Farrell, Joseph P. (2016). God, History, and Dialectic, Volume I: God, The Foundation of the First Europe. pp., 97-98. Terms in brackets added for clarification and emphasis. also presents us with a useful summary of the implications of accepting the Neo-Platonic notion of Absolute Simplicity. It will serve as an appropriate end to this section and will allow us to become aware of the serious consequences of such an apparent minor axiomatic assumption. Those are:

(1). The devaluing of metaphysical categorical symbols by their reduction to absolute identity, in the form of:

(2). Equation of the Names of God; [e.g., being One equals being Good].

(3). Equation of the Essence, Will and Operation(s) [or Energies] of God; and therefore:

(a). A system where God is effectively denied free choice; and

(b). Where free choice is defined in terms of moral oppositions which exist between all choices absolutely, thus producing irresolvable conflicts of “predestination” and “free will”; and

(4). A tendency to produce a three-fold subordinationalism of basic Constituents [e.g., The One, Nous and World Soul, emanated in sequential hierarchical order, or the Neo-Platonic system of Proclus, based on successive triadic components].

(5). A tendency to reduce constituents to absolute Unity.

(6). A tendency to multiply constituents ad infinitum [e.g., the Great Chain of Being or the number of emanated realities].

(7). A definition of the Unity of God in positive terms entailing all the above [God as the All, the Absolute].

(8). A definition of the Unity of God in impersonal terms [Personality being complex and, therefore, an imperfection and a step down from Absolute Simplicity].

(9). A system where abstract impersonal Unity transcends personal Multiplicity in its emphasis.

Early patristic Christianity confronted the same problem of the One and the Many in a different way, arriving at radically different conclusions.

Comparing its theology with the Plotinian philosophical system will shed much light on how working on the resolution of the same problem while holding different starting pre-suppositions can drastically change the outcome. It will also show how a non-dialectical solution to the problem is possible.

Properly orthodox Christian theology always begins⁹Farrell, Joseph P. (2016). God, History, and Dialectic. Volume IV, Note 57 clarifies: “The term ordo theologiae is my own designation. I mean by it not the metaphysical priority of any one category to another as much as the fact that theological questions are asked in a certain order, and the resulting answers indicate any priority of categories, one to another. More importantly, the term designates also the fact that the ordo is very broad and contains basic implications not only for the formulation of doctrine, but its expression in liturgy and devotion as well. In this work, the term has two applications. In Part One, it applies to the non-Augustinian patristic consensus of asking questions in the order indicated. In Parts Two and Three, the Augustinian ordo theologiae is encountered as the exact inversion of the patristic ordo theologiae, and as such asks questions in the following broad categorical order: (1) essence or nature, or sometimes being; (2) attributes or operations; and finally (3) persons. On the subject of the ordo theologiae, St. Basil the Great writes: “If we have not distinct perception of the separate characteristics, namely, fatherhood, sonship, and sanctification, but form our conception of God from the general idea of existence, we cannot possibly give a sound account of our faith.” That this will be the exact error of the Augustinian ordo theologiae, especially of the Mediaeval scholastic theology, will become abundantly clear in Part Two. Contained in this quotation is the implication that revelation (the Persons) takes priority to generalized abstractions concerning “the Deity” (essence).” with the revelation of the Incarnation of the Logos (Jesus Christ). No concept of divine simplicity derived from human reason alone takes precedence over the Gospels and Scripture.

This, which to secular humanists may seem sectarian or short-sighted, is based on the sound metaphysical reasoning and conviction that there is no avoiding the fact that if we want to understand God, the First Principles that will allow us to think about Him have to be received directly from Him. A lower metaphysical and ontological level (mankind and its human reason) cannot derive by itself the axioms that rule in a higher one, let alone understand God´s nature.

This was previously summed up (HERE) in general metaphysical terms, where we noted that no complete knowledge from a domain that transcends ours can, even in principle, be really obtained from inside our domain (the charming little book Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions, by Edwin Abbott, provides a good visual example of this point). We concluded that the only possibility of ever attaining a high degree of certainty regarding higher-order realities was from direct revelation coming directly from this domain above ours. This is what the Incarnation represents.

By following His teachings and the reality of His existence, the implications of who the Christian God really is were unravelled by the early Fathers of the Church¹⁰Nazianzus, St. Gregory (the Theologian). Fifth Theological Oration, VII-VIII. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers. Catholic Way Publishing, pp. 319- 320.. The character of the revealed Trinitarian God (Revealed Theology) was found to be very different, even opposite, to the God of the Philosophers (the One; Natural Theology). Since the Christ was incarnated and made known to us as a Person (Hypostasis), the Fathers started all theologizing with this fact: Personhood is not below God. Later considerations included what He did (God´s Energies or Operations) and, from there, what He is (Nature or Essence) could be deduced.

(1). Personified (Hypostasized) Energies or Attributes of God: which are externalized in the different emanations.

(2). Essence (Nature)

The difference between the above interpretations of the divine can be clearly seen by the difference in language when referring to God.

In Plotinus´ original Greek language, the One is a neuter term (το εν) that is described by the “It” pronoun. Similar to Advaita Vedanta (and to most if not all pantheistic / panentheistic worldviews), it can be equated with the also neuter principle of pure being, or as he put it “That Which exists” (το ον). For St. Basil, to the contrary, God is “He Who exists” (τo ων) and described by the personal pronoun Him. As the Bible says: “I AM Who I AM” (Exodus 3:14).

Another difference with the doctrines of the One, as St. Basil noted, is that in Christian theology the different names of God really designate different energies or attributes of His Essence. Plurality is not opposition but an enriching fullness.

In Christian theology and anthropology, the Essence is what different instances (Persons) have in common. Anything which can be attributed to different Persons (Hypostases) is an essential attribute, property or Energy of that shared (Homoousion) Essence.

The particular and completely unique mode of existence of this Essence or nature, however, is the Person (Hypostasis). This is why the Christian God is called the God of love. This affirmation, which at first sight may appear as just a pietist devotional affirmation, is the logical conclusion of understanding the metaphysical character of the Tri-Une God. Since difference is not opposition for Him, the uniqueness of all creatures can be loved precisely because of it. The One, in contrast, necessarily excludes all uniqueness as an imperfection.

In Christian thought, the unique set of characteristics that each person represents is not seen as a danger to God´s Unity or as the origin of a “fallen” state¹¹Gray, op. cit., p. 132..

The very expectation is that each person, if they are to remain who they are, a particular mode of being of the totality of their nature, should not be immutable nor indistinguishable between them.¹²Gray, op. cit., p. 131 The dialectical (Either / Or) opposition between uniqueness and Unity characteristic of the One is rejected. This can also be seen in the non-dialectical (Both / And) nature of Person and Essence, which imply each other.

No nature does exist abstractly, but has to be actualized (en-hypostasized) into a unique Person (Hypostasis), a “nature with characteristics” or particular mode of existence of that nature. Also, no Person does exist abstractly without an Essence (“en-essenced”).

In Christian theology as explained, for example, by St. Athanasius, the simplicity of God does not obligatorily make identical all distinctions present in the Godhead.

God is truly One in Essence, Manifold in Operations, and Three in Persons. The term “simplicity”, then, just means the indivisibility or impartibility of the Divine Essence. It is one of the attributes of God, not its only defining characteristic.

As St. Athanasius noted, there is no logical reason by which we should be compelled to accept the meaning of the term “simplicity” to always mean what it means in its Neo-Platonic definition.

We might add that there is no reason to limit God by the reification of a particular interpretation regarding one of His attributes. In Christianity, God is the source of Unity. In Impersonal Monism, Unity is the source of many gods.

Furthermore, the Christian God is not defined as pure Actuality without Potentiality, as is the One.

This implies that the faculty of willing, the actual process of using it, and the specific object towards which it is directed, are really different. Therefore, God has free will.

The doctrine of creation out of nothing (Ex Nihilo) also highlights this, because the discontinuity between Creator and Creation has to be willingly bridged by a Personal Will.

Creation, therefore, was willed by God, who declared it to be good. The origin of evil cannot be found, then, in the dialectic between a purely actual God and the pure potentiality without actuality characteristic of matter.

Spirit / Matter Dualism is not found in Orthodox Christian thought, even if the original state of the bodies that are intrinsic to each soul (as well as that of souls themselves) was partially injured when the human nature that contains them both fell.

Christianity not only has a non-dialectical God in the Trinity. Its opposition to dialectics can be seen in all aspects of its theology and metaphysics. The incarnation of the Logos is the clearest example.

In Jesus Christ, his two natures (human and divine) are not fused together but joined inseparably, with each nature communicating to the other what it can do (its properties, attributes or energies; Communicatio Idiomatum).

The two natures of Christ are both personified in Christ´s Person (two en-hypostases, one for each nature), but not in two different Persons (Hypostases). The fact that the God of Chrisitanity is personal was always seen as a key aspect for our possible salvation / deification. As a Person, He could assume our nature, resurrect it and ascend with it “to the right hand of the Father” (1 Peter 3:22). An impersonal First Principle or God could not have assumed anything, only re-absorbed it, therefore discarding our uniqueness in the process.

The whole life of Jesus Christ was understood as a testimony to this specifically Christian doctrine of the interpenetration of His two natures and a declaration of what unity truly meant: the joining of the different in a communion of will and action that enriches and elevates all; the gaining of “the Other”, not the loss of the self.

The Christ performed human actions in a divine way (e.g., such as walking on water) and divine actions in a human way (e.g., healing miracles and resurrection of the dead through human speech and touch). Both His life and His death were always understood as a revelation, a lesson and a declaration of theology´s (the knowledge of God) First Principles.

1. The One and the Many: Studies in the Philosophy of Order and Ultimacy. R.J. Rushdoony.
2. God, History, and Dialectic (Vol. I and II). Joseph P. Farrell.
3. Five Theological Orations. St. Gregory Nazianzus.
4. The Enneads. Plotinus.

1. Plotinus. Enneads, 3:2:13. Trans. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, , Vol. III., pp. 81, 83, 85.
2. Inge, Dean (1918). The Philosophy of Plotinus. Longmans. Green And Co. Vol. II, p. 109.
3. Farrell, Joseph P. (2016). God, History, and Dialectic, Volume I: God, The Foundation of the First Europe, p.107.
4. These distinctions, however, are crucial for the Christian Tri-Une God and its solution to the problem of the One and the Many, as we will later see.
5. Tillich, Paul (1956). A History of Christian Thought. Must Have Books, p. 52.
6. This structure follows the Filioque structure of the Trinity of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, as we will see in the next articles.
7. The “alone to the Alone” is found in Enneads 5:1:6.
8. Farrell, Joseph P. (2016). God, History, and Dialectic, Volume I: God, The Foundation of the First Europe. pp., 97-98. Terms in brackets added for clarification and emphasis.
9. Farrell, Joseph P. (2016). God, History, and Dialectic. Volume IV, Note 57 clarifies:

   “The term ordo theologiae is my own designation. I mean by it not the metaphysical priority of any one category to another as much as the fact that theological questions are asked in a certain order, and the resulting answers indicate any priority of categories, one to another. More importantly, the term designates also the fact that the ordo is very broad and contains basic implications not only for the formulation of doctrine, but its expression in liturgy and devotion as well.

   In this work, the term has two applications. In Part One, it applies to the non-Augustinian patristic consensus of asking questions in the order indicated. In Parts Two and Three, the Augustinian ordo theologiae is encountered as the exact inversion of the patristic ordo theologiae, and as such asks questions in the following broad categorical order: (1) essence or nature, or sometimes being; (2) attributes or operations; and finally (3) persons.

   On the subject of the ordo theologiae, St. Basil the Great writes: “If we have not distinct perception of the separate characteristics, namely, fatherhood, sonship, and sanctification, but form our conception of God from the general idea of existence, we cannot possibly give a sound account of our faith.” That this will be the exact error of the Augustinian ordo theologiae, especially of the Mediaeval scholastic theology, will become abundantly clear in Part Two.

   Contained in this quotation is the implication that revelation (the Persons) takes priority to generalized abstractions concerning “the Deity” (essence).”

10. Nazianzus, St. Gregory (the Theologian). Fifth Theological Oration, VII-VIII. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers. Catholic Way Publishing, pp. 319- 320.
11. Gray, op. cit., p. 132.
12. Gray, op. cit., p. 131.
13. Rushdoony, R.J. (1971). The One and the Many: Studies in the Philosophy of Order and Ultimacy. Chalcedon / Ross House Books, p. 32.
14. Van Til, C. (1972). Common Grace and the Gospel. P & R Publishing Co, p. 64, para.break deleted:

    “The ontological Trinity will be our interpretative concept everywhere. God is our concrete universal; in Him thought and being are coterminous, in Him the problem of knowledge is solved. If we begin thus with the ontological Trinity as our concrete universal, we frankly differ from every school of philosophy and from every school of science not merely in our conclusions, but in our starting-point and in our method as well. For us the facts are what they are, and the universals are what they are, because of their common dependence upon the ontological Trinity. Thus, as earlier discussed, the facts are correlative to the universals. Because of this correlativity there is genuine progress in history; because of it the Moment has significance.”

15. Rushdoony, R.J. (1971). The One and the Many: Studies in the Philosophy of Order and Ultimacy. Chalcedon / Ross House Books, p. 115.
16. Van Til, C. (1955). The Defense of the Faith, 43; 26 in 1963 ed. P & R Publishing Co.
17. Lett Feltoe, Charles. Trans., Leo the Great, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol. 12 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1956), Letter CXXIV, 93.